The primary principle. by Bross, I D
Letter to the Editor
Dear Sir:
Recently I submitted a paper to EHP proposing a
guideline for action to protect the public against en-
vironmental hazards arising from technological
products and processes. I called it the "Primacy
Principle." To implement this guideline, I sug-
gested a special format and review procedure for
papers presenting new data on technological
hazards. The EHP reviewers didn't care for my
proposals and unanimously rejected my paper. As
one reviewer remarked, "I doubt if EHP, as a
purely scientific journal, should go into this ad-
ministrative and political field."
There was some suggestion that the paper might
be more appropriate if it were recast as a "Letter to
the Editor" or presented at an APHA conference
where a '"more immediate consensus" on the pro-
posals would be possible. In what follows, I have
tried to follow both suggestions by rewriting the
material as a letter and incorporating some of the
editorial reactions. Therefore let me start with the
original statement of the "Primacy Principle:"
With potential technological hazards to the public
health, the "benefit of the doubt" must go to the
public and not to the technology.
There seems to be two main objections to the
Primacy Principle. One criticism is that it is not
"iscientific," that is "political" or "subjective." I
agree. When (as here) we are dealing with the set-
ting of priorities, we are necessarily outside of the
boundaries of "pure science." We are dealing with
the value systems of human beings. However I
would argue that environmental health is not "pure
science." There is no good reason for the public to
support such research unless the findings are trans-
lated into action programs to protect the public
from environmental hazards. Effective action in-
volves setting of priorities. Therefore, the topic,
"scientific" or not, seems to me appropriate for a
journal called Env'ironmental Health Perspectives.
Another objection involves the concept that sci-
ence is '"neutral," that it is neither on the side ofthe
proponents of a potentially hazardous technology
nor the side of the public. Insofar as the estimates
of hazard are based on sound statistical methods
applied to reliable factual evidence-insofar as the
estimation is scientific-then the estimates can be
objective, unbiased, and neutral. However, it is a
fact of life that in any complex actual health issue
will not have scientifically valid estimates of all of
the relevant benefits and costs. To take action, we
eventually must do some guessing. When we talk
about the benefit of the doubt we are talking about
guesswork, not science.
Guesswork is inherently subjective and this is
true even when it is called expert opinion or linear
extrapolation or risk-benefit analysis. This is where
the benefit of the doubt comes in. When we guess,
we can make mistakes in either direction. The Pri-
macy Principle says we should prefer to fail in a
direction which will be fail-safe for the public.
When we have to guess, we explicitly give the pub-
lic priority over technology.
A different kind ofobjection to the Primacy Prin-
ciple is that it is too vague. This vagueness is inher-
ent in general guidelines and can be reduced by ex-
ploring the implications of a general principle. By
applying the principle to the troublesome questions
about the "burden of proof" in publications on po-
tentially hazardous uses of technology, for exam-
ple, I suggested the following amplification: Under
this principle, the burden of proof is on the health
scientist to produce prima facie evidence of hazard.
Once this is done the burden of proof shifts to the
proponents of a technology to show it is safe.
The evidence needed for a prima facie case is
analogous to that required for a grand jury indict-
ment (as opposed to conviction at an actual trial).
Thus it is sufficient to present an outline ofthe data,
the methodology, and the conclusions to show that
there is a case for the existence of the hazard. The
case itself (with full details and discussion) would
presumably require a hearing and could not be pre-
sented in a single paper. Where possible, references
to evidence should be cited rather than reproducing
all the material in detail. The argument or rationale
should be in plain English rather than in a technical
or scientific jargon.
To implement this working rule for determining
the burden of proof, some expeditious way of com-
municating the early warning report (and the prima
facie case) to the health scientists and to the public
is needed. What I suggested was that some journal
(not necessarily EHP) regularly print such early
warning reports. This does not mean that any and
every warning would be printed. There would have
to be new data (or new analyses of previous data)
presented that might be considered a prima facie
case for environmental hazard. Neither the journal
nor the referees would have to accept or endorse
the findings. These points could be made very clear
in explanatory text introducing the Early Warning
Report. It would be up to the readership, and ulti-
mately the public, to judge whether or not a prima
facie case had indeed been made.
Since the suggested format for an early warning
paper is somewhat different from the traditional
formats (for instance, it would not include any ex-
tensive literature review), there would have to be
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be based on something specifically wrong with the
data or the methodology (and not on general objec-
tions or doubts). Precautions would have to be
taken against having proponents of the potentially
hazardous technology (or their scientific allies)
block the publication of early warning reports.
The reaction of the referees to these suggestions
for implementing the burden of proof proposal was
extremely negative, and I have had similar reac-
tions from other scientists. When I have made the
suggestions to concerned citizens groups or the
general public, however, the reaction has generally
been favorable. This polarization is something
which concerns me and which I think should con-
cern the scientific community.
All of the referees were much concerned about
false alarms from the early warning system. One
suggests: "I also wonder when the public will start
to look at these early warnings as unproductive,
since it may in one month alone suggest that eating,
drinking, and breathing may be exceedingly
dangerous for a multitude ofnew discoveries. Over-
loading the system will occur based on our knowl-
edge of what papers have appeared in the literature
in the last few months requiring action."
Another referee says: "I think our present chan-
nels existing today are very accurate to take care of
the alertness. As an example I would like to men-
tion the case ofthe flame retardants, the saccharin,
and the spray paint . . . I think it would be a waste
ofmoney and paper to create a so-called early warn-
ing system as described in this paper by Dr. Bross.
It probably would have been very accurate to do
what he is proposing ten years ago, but I think he is
out of date."
A third referee says: ". . . the author can have
very little idea ofthe high proportion offalse alarms
which occur in the more general field. The early
publication of such alarms before adequate evi-
dence is gathered could have serious effect on pub-
lic confidence in scientists-one can cry 'wolf' too
often."
Doubtless many, perhaps most, EHP readers
would share this preoccupation with false alarms.
From my contacts with concerned citizens, how-
ever, I can report that a "serious effect on public
confidence in scientists" already exists. It is not,
however, a result of scientists crying "wolf" too
often. The citizens are concerned because rela-
tively few scientists have been on the side of the
public in efforts to obtain adequate protection
against environmental hazards. Indeed, the citizens
find that much of the time the scientific or medical
establishment is on the other side of any effort to
circumscribe the uses of technology. For instance,
in the recent legislative battles over protecting the
public against the potential hazards of recombinant
DNA research, the lobbyists against "government
interference" included the president of MIT, rep-
resentatives of Harvard, Stanford, and Cornell, and
spokesmen for various scientific societies. So while
traditional scientists may give top priority to avoid-
ing false alarms, the public gives top priority to get-
ting protective action on real alarms.
Avoiding "false alarms" at all costs is a luxury
that only "pure science" can afford. In "pure sci-
ence" the usual way to avoid making a wrong
statement is to make a nonstatement (but in very
technical language). However, to protect the public
against environmental hazards, actions are needed
and not just empty statements. Taking action al-
ways involves nonnegligible risks, in part because
inaction is itself a course of action. The dread of
being accused of giving a false alarm and having
one's reputation damaged often results in inaction.
It is again a matter of inverted priorities. While
reputation is important to a scientist, it is a small
personal cost when the health and safety of other
human beings is at stake. If factual evidence shows
that a hazard exists, I believe a scientist has the
responsibility of warning the public irrespective of
the opinions of colleagues. Over the years, I have
been accused at least a dozen times of sounding
false alarms which subsequently turned out to be
very real alarms. This has won me no medals from
the establishment but I've saved a large number of
lives this way.
The tendency of scientists to talk and temporize
indefinitely instead of taking action on a public
health issue has consistently worked to the advan-
tage of proponents ofhazardous uses of technology
and against the public. This may not be a deliberate
bias toward technology but it has the same effect.
The Primacy Principle explicitly counterbalances
this bias.
The article originally submitted to EHP was ac-
companied by an example of an early warning re-
port. Readers who might like to see how the format
for such a report would differ from a conventional
paper will find this example (with some minor am-
plification) in the May 30, 1977 issue of the Jolrnal
of the American Medical Association 237: 2399).
This early warning report by Bross and Natarajan
concerns genetic damage from diagnostic radiation.
The editorial history of this article indicates the
need for formats and reviewing procedures that
would facilitate the communication on information
on environmental hazards to the public. In this in-
stance the publication was held up about a year.
Other warning articles have been held much longer
or delayed indefinitely. It is especially difficult for
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known, are not connected with a well-known in-
stitution, or lack special credentials. However, an
early warning report should not be judged by the
name of the author but by the data and methodol-
ogy.
Although the report by Bross and Natarajan was
rejected for a variety of reasons, none of them in-
volved any specific faults in the data, the methodol-
ogy, or the quantitative conclusions. The objections
were to style, format, and trivia and not to sub-
stance. One reviewer was so annoyed that I had not
cited his negative findings he cited them in his re-
view. Another reviewer objected that there was no
confirmatory report-an unreasonable requirement
for an early warning report. Actually there are the
independent, mutually confirmatory findings of
Mancuso, Stewart, and Kneale which are coming
out in Health Physics. Lack of comprehensive re-
view of literature, lack of a general discussion of
radiation hazards, and lack of other traditional
trappings were other reasons for objections. Such
irrelevant and persnickety reasons were given for
keeping the news about genetic damage from ordi-
nary diagnostic radiation from the public for a year.
There is nothing exceptional about this editorial
history of a paper on the hazards of low levels of
ionizing radiation except that the delay was so
short. Other papers in this area have been blocked
by the proponents of radiation technology for years
and in some cases indefinitely. I have given a con-
gressional committee documentary evidence of the
partly successful attempt to block publication ofthe
Mancuso, Stewart, and Kneale article (it was de-
layed until after funding was cut off "for lack of
publications") and ofthe successful attempt to sup-
press a previous report ofcancer deaths among the
workers at the Hanford reprocessing plant. A re-
viewer chides me for my "jaundiced view of scien-
tists" but when this sort ofthing has been going on
in the radiation area for more than two decades one
gets a jaundiced view.
In part these efforts to block publication may be a
matter ofthe research area. However whenever the
technological hazards involve many millions ofdol-
lars, I have found that the game is played this way.
The strategy of the proponents of hazardous tech-
nology is to delay or confuse the health issues by
any and all means and they can always find some
scientists to help them do this. The same reviewer
says "In contrast, the cases that I can recall of
delay in dealing with real hazards are few." On my
part, I have seen very few instances of prompt and
effective action to protect the public against car-
cinogens from products or processes that were of
great economic importance. We still have not dealt
effectively with the health hazards of cigarettes al-
though the facts of the matter were clear 25 years
ago when I just became involved.
A strong affirmation ofthe Primacy Principle and
steps to implement it are, I believe, a necessary and
useful first step toward giving the public the protec-
tion against environmental hazards that it so badly
needs. As I told congressional committees on June
14 and June 17 of this year, cancer is a preventable
disease and with effective primary prevention pro-
grams we could be well on our way to preventing it
by the end of the century. To do this, however, we
have to change the approaches and attitudes that
have blocked action and progress in recent years and
restructure our priorities to favor doing something
about environmental hazards instead ofjust talking
about them.
IRWIN D. J. BROSS
Roswell Park Memorial Institute
Buffalo, New York
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